Abstract. Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees. [Word Count: 99] 
Introduction
This paper is a work in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. I am concerned with whether a mental state or property -belief -comes in degrees. Some things come in degrees. Mass, height, heat, and distance come in degrees. Dogs, water, citizenship, and pregnancy do not. The thesis of this paper is that beliefs belong in the second group, not the first group.
I have said that this paper is a work in metaphysics. Now, the view that belief comes in degrees at least appears to play a prominent role in normative disciplines such as formal epistemology and decision theory. Does my paper undermine the worthy endeavors of these disciplines? Not necessarily. At least some formal epistemologists are technically defining 'belief' and then saying that the thing picked out by 'belief', according to their stipulated definition, is something that comes in degrees. For example, technical term,' and follows Frank Ramsey (1931) by defining 'degree-of-belief' in terms of decision theoretic concepts. 1 Jeffrey famously writes, 'Our ordinary notion of belief is only vestigially present in the notion of degree of belief. I am inclined to think Ramsey sucked the marrow out of the ordinary notion ' (1970, 171-172) .
In this paper, I'll set aside the question of whether Ramsey successfully sucked the marrow out of the ordinary notion. 2 My point is that so long as formal epistemologists and decision theorists are, like Jeffrey, using 'belief' in a technically-defined sense, and not in its ordinary sense, they are making no commitments about the question of whether beliefs come in degrees. Hence, my discussion is at least not directly relevant to their work. Similarly, if someone technically defined the term 'God' to mean Ralph Nader and then proceeded to argue that Nader does not exist (only using 'God' whenever she meant Ralph Nader), philosophers of religion would not find such claims relevant to their work.
Some philosophers may simply be intending to communicate that confidence comes in degrees when they say, 'Beliefs come in degrees.' I wholeheartedly agree that confidence comes in degrees. However, I am arguing that beliefs do not come in degrees.
I will say more about the relationship between belief and confidence in coming sections, but for now, I'll simply note that it is at least not obvious that 'Belief comes in degrees' is equivalent to 'Confidence comes in degrees.' Hence, it is at least not obvious that my thesis commits me to the radical conclusion that confidence does not come in degrees.
Some may now think that my thesis is so unradical that it is uninteresting. Here are four points to address this concern. First, there are a number of arguments, normally in the epistemological literature, both for and against the claim that beliefs come in degrees. The fact that there are these arguments, which I will assess in this paper, is evidence that people find the thesis interesting. Second, I suspect that some philosophers, including epistemologists, have not taken the time to think carefully through the distinctions between 'belief', 'confidence', 'credence', and related terms. This paper can help with conceptual ground clearing. Third, many philosophers, when talking about belief, feel the need to use expressions like 'outright belief', 'binary belief', 'full belief', 'all-out belief', or 'all-or-nothing belief', as if there were such a thing as degreed (or partial or graded) belief with which to contrast. 3 If my thesis is successfully defended, then we can just cleanly and simply use 'belief', no qualifications necessary. Lastly, even if this paper does not have immediate implications for formal epistemology and decision theory, neither do most metaphysical questions, such as whether there are universals, or whether a person endures or perdures. The question of whether a facet of reality -belief -has the property of coming in degrees might be intrinsically interesting to philosophers.
In §1, I present and criticize the common confidence argument that beliefs come in degrees. In §2, I discuss two arguments from natural language: one in favor of my thesis and one against it. I conclude that both arguments have limited persuasive power since they depend on premises that are not likely to be shared by dissenters. In §3, I
make precise a common argument that beliefs do come in degrees, what I call the firmness argument, and I argue that it fails. I end the section by briefly arguing, on the basis of simple intuition, that beliefs do not come in degrees. Lastly, in §4, I explore the metaphysics of degrees and then defend a new and more substantive argument that beliefs do not come in degrees, what I call the determinables argument.
The Confidence Argument
In this section, I show that a prominent argument that beliefs come in degrees rests on an unsupported assumption. One reason many epistemologists cite for thinking that beliefs come in degrees is that attributing degrees of confidence is intuitive. In the introduction to a volume of collected papers called Degrees of Belief, Franz Huber (2009) opens with the following remarks:
Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow… The higher an agent's degree of belief for a particular proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition… The purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive overview and assessment of the currently prevailing theories of degrees of belief (1).
Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (2009) write,
We are more confident of the truth of some propositions than others. You are presumably more confident that the next British prime minister will be a Conservative than a Liberal Democrat… We should allow, then, that there is such a thing as graded belief-roughly being more or less confident of the truth of a proposition. But there also seems to be such a thing as outright believing, which is binary (128).
Scott Sturgeon (2008) writes that
[B]elief can seem coarse-grained. It can look like a three-part affair: either given to a claim, given to its negation, or withheld… [B] elief can seem fine-grained. It can look as if one invests levels of confidence rather than all-or-nothing belief. In this sense of belief one does not simply believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement.
One believes to a certain degree, invests confidence which can vary across quite a range (140).
David Christensen (2004) writes that [B] elief is an attitude that one can either take, or fail to take, with respect to a given claim... Nevertheless, the binary model does not provide the only plausible way of conceiving of belief. It is clear, after all, that we have much more confidence in some things we believe than in others. Sometimes our level of confidence in the truth of a given claim decreases gradually-say, as slight bits of counterevidence trickle in… This suggests that underlying our binary way of talking about belief is an epistemic phenomenon that admits of degrees (13-14).
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Notice that although these philosophers think that beliefs come in degrees, other remarks indicate that they also are sympathetic to the 'binary model' (Christensen) or a 'coarse-grained' view (Sturgeon) or the existence of 'outright' belief (Fantl and McGrath) . There is no inconsistency here; they might hold that one type of belief comes in degrees and another type does not. But it at least seems that they are making the positive claim that at least one type of belief comes in degrees.
Here are three more points about the above quotes. First, the claims of Huber, et.al. are about belief and not about something merely belief-like that shares some of belief's properties. 5 Second, they are trying to illustrate how beliefs come in degrees.
Third, they seem to think that by illustrating the plausible thesis that confidence comes in degrees, it thereby follows that they have shown how belief (or a certain type of belief) comes in degrees.
This supposed illustration of belief coming in degrees is best explained by the hypothesis that they are assuming a premise like one of the following:
4 For more examples, see Harman (1986, 22) , Foley (1992, 111) , Erikkson and Hajek (2007, 209) , Frankish (2009, 75) , Staffel (2013, 3537) , and Konek (2016, 509-510) . 5 Hence, although some philosophers might say, 'I just meant confidence when I said "belief",' I am now taking them at their word that they mean belief when they say 'belief'.
Assumption 1:
The property of having confidence that p is identical to the property of having belief that p.
Assumption 2: 'Belief' and 'confidence' pick out the same thing.
They then infer that since the property of having confidence, or the thing picked out by 'confidence', comes in degrees, it follows that belief comes in degrees.
However, no reasons are given for Assumptions 1 and 2. They seem to just be assumed. Now, on the face of things, belief and confidence do seem to be similar sorts of mental entities; perhaps they are identical. On the other hand, our having formed different words for them is some evidence that they are distinct. So, as it stands, I see no convincing argument here that beliefs come in degrees. We will have to look elsewhere for better arguments. 
Arguments from Natural Language
In §2.1 and §2.2, I provide two arguments that appeal to natural language: one that is in favor of my thesis and one that is against it. Although I find the argument in favor of my thesis to be convincing, I admit that both arguments will have limited persuasive power for those who disagree.
An Argument from Language that Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees
In this section, I start by presenting a weak, but instructive, version of an argument that beliefs do not come in degrees. I then end the section by presenting a stronger version of that argument.
Jay has the belief that unicorns are real. He also has confidence that this is so.
We see in the previous two sentences that both belief and confidence can be ascribed by a noun. Now consider, 1) 'I have much confidence that she is the one.'
2) 'I have little confidence that she is the one.'
These ordinary English sentences make perfect sense. Reflection on (1) and (2) There are familiar syntactic criteria for the distinction: count nouns admit of pluralization, can occur with numerals, take 'a' and 'every' in the singular and 'few' and 'many' in the plural; while mass nouns take singular verbs, cannot occur with numerals, take determiners like 'much' and 'little' rather than 'few' and 'many' and so on (53).
Examples of count nouns are 'deer', 'tree, 'toy', and 'chimney'. Examples of mass nouns are 'stamina', 'energy', 'strength', and 'lava'. Note that paradigm propositional attitudes that come in degrees are all denoted by mass nouns: 'confidence', 'doubt', 'hope', 'fear', 'desire'. We can properly say, 'I have little doubt that they can do it,' 'I have much fear that they can do it,' and 'I have little hope that they can do it,' in addition to (1) and (2).
On the other hand, things denoted by count nouns typically do not come in degrees.
However, it is incorrect to say that all nouns are either a mass noun or a count noun simpliciter. Rather, their occurrences are either one or the other. I can have little hope that she is the one, but I can also have a hope that she is the one. In the previous sentence, 'hope' occurred as both a mass noun and also as a count noun. 'Belief' can also occur as either a mass noun or a count noun. Although it typically occurs as a count noun, in the following sentence, 5) 'There is more religious belief in this century than in the previous one,'
'belief' is used as a mass noun.
Here, now, is a stronger version of the argument from natural language that beliefs do not come in degrees:
i) If a propositional attitude X comes in degrees, then higher or lower degrees of X can be properly attributed to a person by an occurrence of a mass noun.
ii) Higher or lower degrees of belief cannot be properly ascribed to a person by an occurrence of a mass noun.
iii) Therefore, beliefs do not come in degrees.
Consider (i). One can talk of much hope, little confidence, much desire, and so on. For any paradigm propositional attitude that comes in degrees, higher or lower degrees of that attitude can be attributed to a person by way of an occurrence of a mass noun. This is inductive evidence for (i).
Consider (ii). One cannot ascribe higher or lower degrees of belief to a person with 'belief'. (5) does ascribe belief by way of a mass noun, but this only ascribes a number of single beliefs to a population, not a degree of belief to a single individual.
Whenever belief is ascribed to a single person by way of a noun, it is by the occurrence of a count noun and not a mass noun. That is why (3) and (4) do not make sense. From (i) and (ii), it follows that beliefs do not come in degrees.
An Argument from Language that Beliefs Come in Degrees
I find the second argument in §2.1 to be convincing. However, others might not. Scott
Sturgeon (2008) writes, After all, predicates of the form 'believes that P' look to be gradable. We can append modifiers to belief predicates without difficulty-John believes that P more than Jane does. And we can conjoin the negation of suchlike without conflict-John believes that P but not fully. These linguistic facts indicate that predicates of the form 'believes that P' are gradable (142).
If Sturgeon thinks it is natural to say, 6) 'John believes that P more than Jane does,' and 7) 'John believes that P but not fully,' then he will probably countenance sentences such as 8) 'John has more belief that P than Jane does.'
These sentences might be taken as evidence that beliefs come in degrees. They might also be taken to be evidence that premise (ii), of my above argument, is false. So, How do we break this impasse? At this point, I will simply conclude that these arguments from natural language will likely not be persuasive to the opposing party who has different intuitions. We will have to move to other arguments. (In §3.1, I will explain why I think none of (6)- (8) gives us reason to think that beliefs come in degrees.)
The Firmness Argument and the Intuition Argument
In §3.1, I present and criticize the firmness argument that beliefs come in degrees. In §3.2, I present the intuition argument that they do not come in degrees.
The Firmness Argument
Daniel Hunter (1996) writes,
Belief is sometimes taken to be an all-or-nothing affair… At other times, however, we wish to think of belief as a matter of degree, not as an all-or-nothing matter. We recognize that there are some things we believe more strongly than others. For example, I believe that 2 + 2 = 4 and I also believe that Neanderthals buried their dead, but I believe the former proposition much more firmly than the latter (75).
Richard Pettigrew (2015) writes, Our beliefs come in degrees; we believe some more strongly than others. For instance, I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow more strongly than I believe that it will rise every morning for the coming week; and I believe both of these propositions much more strongly than I believe that there will be an earthquake tomorrow in Bristol.
Consider some more examples: and 'strongly' have similar enough meanings for the purposes of this paper, I will stick to using 'firmly'.) Call these sentences 'modified-belief ascriptions'. Unlike the disputable sentences (6)-(8) from the previous section, modified-belief ascriptions are beyond reproach. Hunter and Pettigrew seem to think that the fact that they are sometimes true is good evidence that beliefs come in degrees. Call this the firmness argument.
The argument fails. Although a property of something might come in degrees, the thing itself might not. A deer has mass, and mass comes in degrees; a tree has height, and height comes in degrees. But neither the deer nor the tree come in degrees. I might see a panda with much clarity. Although the clarity with which I see the panda might come in degrees, my seeing the panda does not. Similarly, the firmness (or doubt or certainty) with which a belief is held might come in degrees, but it does not follow that the belief itself does. 9 So, (9)- (14) 
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The following biconditionals show how the presence or absence of certainty with which S believes that p is related to confidence:
17) S believes with certainty that p if and only if S believes that p and is completely confident that p.
9 P.M.S. Hacker (2004, 192) concurs: 'Of course, one may strongly or firmly believe that p (though not "weakly" or "moderately"), but this does not indicate a degree of belief. It signifies the strength or firmness with which one cleaves to the belief one has.' 10 See Gardenfors and Makinson (1988) , Rott (2009 ), Huber (2009 2016, sect. 3.4), and Smith (2016, 174) . Rott writes, "A measure of the firmness of belief can be seen in their invulnerability, that is, the resistance they offer against being given up" (303). However, I disagree with Rott to the extent that he, like Hunter, seems to identify the degree of firmness of belief with the degree of belief itself. On the other hand, Huber (2016, sect. 3.4) writes, "It is, however, fair to say that belief revision theorists distinguish between degrees of belief and entrenchment. Entrenchment, so they say, characterizes the agent's unwillingness to give up a particular qualitative belief, which may be different from her degree of belief for the respective sentence or proposition." However, I disagree with Huber and those he mentions to the extent that they think that belief comes in degrees. I would have fewer qualms, however, if these philosophers proposed to use 'degree of belief' as a technical term for 'degree of firmness of belief'. Thanks to a referee of this journal for helpful discussion. Cf. Audi (2011, 100 To sum up, the modified-belief ascriptions (9)- (14) only ascribe some degree of firmness or some degree of confidence and a non-degreed belief to a subject. There is no good reason to think that they ascribe a degree of belief.
The discussion of this section also reveals a response to the argument from (6)-
The intended meanings of (6) and (8) than Jane does', and the intended meaning of (7) by 'John believes that P but isn't certain about it.' When I hear (6)-(8) in such a way that they don't sound bad, it is because I am hearing them as these modified-belief ascriptions; when I try to read them literally, they still seem nonsensical. So, as with (9)- (14), we can see that there is no good reason to think that degrees of belief are being ascribed by (6)-(8).
Here is an analogy. Suppose a friend replies to something I say by remarking, on January 1, 3000 with a moderately high degree of confidence. He is not maximally confident because he recognizes that he is a fallible interpreter. Later, he has a vision of an angel (as would be expected in his religion) who tells him that any future evidence, either for or against his belief, will be misleading. With absolute trust in this vision, he continues to hold his belief that it will rain on January 1, 3000 with a moderately high degree of confidence. On future occasions, when people give him evidence for and against his belief, he holds firmly to it with exactly that degree of confidence.
Eventually, at an old age, he has even forgotten the vision but continues to believe with that same degree of confidence that it will rain on January 1, 3000, but now it is simply out of habit. Virtually nothing could sway his belief, even the appearance of another angel. In this case, the degree of firmness with which Fred's belief is held is extremely 12 Thanks to Crystal Allen and Philip Swenson for help formulating the case. Notice also that the property of firmness can also be a property of one's suspension of judgment. An agnostic, for example, who suspends judgment about God's existence might be very firm in his withholding. Some people are psychologically such that it would be extremely hard for them to move to either atheism or theism. Similarly, one could have a high degree of confidence that p but be such that she would easily give up that degree of confidence; and one could have a low degree of confidence that p but be such that she would not easily give up that degree of confidence.
The Metaphysics of Degrees and the Determinables Argument
In §4.1- §4.2, I explore more systematically the question of what it is for something to come in degrees. On the basis of this exploration, I present a novel argument in §4.3 that beliefs do not come in degrees. (Suppose someone thinks that beliefs are concrete entities-e.g., mental
The Metaphysics of Degrees and the Determinables-Determinates Condition
representations-existing in the brain. 13 If beliefs are such concrete entities, then they are individuals. Individuals do not come in degrees. Therefore, beliefs do not come in degrees. Some will not accept this theory of the nature of belief and so will not be convinced by this argument. I mention it briefly for those who do accept it.)
Substances, such as water, gold, and lava, cannot be counted. We do not ask 'How many?' but 'How much?' For example, we can sensibly ask how much lava is in the room. Furthermore, substances are always designated by mass nouns. Now, it is initially tempting to think that something X comes in degrees if there can be much X, little X, more X, or less X. However, reflection on substances shows otherwise. There 13 A proponent of representationalism, a view defended by Millikan (1984) , Fodor (1987) , and Dretske (1988) Degrees Analysis: X comes in degrees if and only if, possibly, there is some object O1 and some object O2 such that both O1 and O2 instantiate X, and O1 has more X than O2 does.
My analysis determines that strength and mass come in degrees; two objects could instantiate mass, and one could have more mass than the other. It excludes both individuals -such as rocks, trees, and dogs -as well as substances -such as water and lava -since they cannot be instantiated. It also excludes properties such as millionaireness, citizenship, and pregnancy, because there cannot be more or less of them. So, my analysis fits our intuitions.
I am not saying that X comes in degrees if and only if it sounds natural, in ordinary English, to say, 'There is more or less of X.' On the one hand, height comes in degrees, but we do not say, 'Fred has more height than Sally.' However, it seems that Fred can have more height than Sally, and we would express this by saying, 'Fred is taller than Sally.' On the other hand, we can properly say, 'Sally has more knowledge than Fred,' but it does not follow that knowledge comes in degrees. In that sentence, we are only saying that Sally knows more propositions than Fred. So, the focus should be on whether it seems that an object can have more or less of something and not just on whether the sentences sound natural to say.
How are we to understand the expression, 'O1 has more X than O2 does'? 16 To answer this, I will first provide some metaphysics background. Both my snow globe and my marble have mass, and the former has more mass than the latter. Now this is an odd phenomenon. How is it that both fully instantiate a property, but one object has more of that property than another? Here, we should turn to the distinction between determinates and determinables. 17 A determinable is a property like being red, and a determinate is a property like being light red. A property is a determinate relative to a determinable, and there will be many determinates for any determinable. The properties being light red, being maroon, and being orangish-red are all determinates relative to the determinable being red. Furthermore, the properties being red, being orange, and being yellow are determinates relative to the determinable having color. One way to think of it is that a determinate is a specific way of instantiating a determinable, where the instantiation of the determinate entails the instantiation of the corresponding determinable. Returning to the above example, the snow globe and marble both instantiate the same determinable, the property having mass, but they instantiate different determinates. The former instantiates the determinate being 25g, and the latter instantiates the determinate being 5g. Both of these properties entail having mass.
We can see that all degreed properties are determinables with a corresponding set of determinates. For example, corresponding to the property having mass, there is a set of properties which includes the following elements: being 1g, being 1.1g, being 5g, being 25g, etc. Corresponding to the property temperature (or having a temperature), there is the set which includes the following: being 2 o C, being 3 o C, etc. Let us say that the determinates for these degreed properties are 'degree-ordered'. Some determinates are not degree-ordered. Corresponding to the property being colored, there is the following set of determinates: being red, being orange, being yellow, etc. These determinates might even be properly said to be ordered (according to the colors of the rainbow), but they are not degree-ordered in the way that the above determinates for mass and heat are. A red object does not have more color than an orange object in the same way that a 25g-object has more mass than a 5g-object.
From the above discussion, we can draw the following necessary condition for degrees.
Determinables-Determinates Condition: If P comes in degrees, then P is a determinable with a corresponding set of determinates that are degree-ordered.
So far, I have mostly just been categorizing and labeling properties. I do not intend to answer deeper metaphysical questions regarding what makes a set of determinates degree-ordered, or which of determinates or determinables are more fundamental.
Answering these questions is not necessary for the purposes of my paper. 
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Having money comes in degrees; it is a determinable with a set of degree-ordered determinates: having $1, …, having $10, …, having $1,000,000, ..., having $1,000,010, etc. Call that set 'M'. Now consider the property being a millionaire. This is also a determinable with a set of degree-ordered determinates: having $1, 000,000, having $1,000,010, etc. This set is a proper subset of M. Although money possession comes in degrees (a person can have more money than another person), being a millionaire does not come in degrees (even if one person has $1,000,010 and another has $1,000,005, the former is not more millionaire than the latter).
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From this example, I suggest the following:
18 They are discussed by Bigelow and Pargetter (1988) and Armstrong (1997, c. 4) . 19 I am thankful for a referee of this journal whose comments pushed me to develop the points in this section. 20 Thinking about Mark Kaplan's (1996, 91) use of being a millionaire as an illustration of the threshold view of the relationship between belief and confidence (explained in the next section) helped me to realize that I could use being a millionaire here, although for a different purpose.
Anti-Threshold Condition:
If P1 is a determinable that comes in degrees with a corresponding set D1 of determinates that are degree-ordered, P2 is a determinable with a corresponding set D2 of determinates, and D2 is a proper subset of D1, then P2 does not come in degrees.
The Anti-Threshold Condition has some initially surprising implications. I'll argue that those implications are actually intuitive and thereby increase the plausibility of the condition.
Consider the property having fear. Plausibly, fear comes in degrees; one can have more or less fear. Furthermore, fear is a determinable with a set of determinates: having 1 unit of fear, having 2 units of fear, and so on. Call this set 'F'. Now notice that one can have just a little bit of fear, but still not count as being afraid. For that, one must have, say, 10 units of fear or more. So, being afraid will be a determinable with a corresponding set of determinates that is a proper subset of S. It follows by the AntiThreshold Condition that being afraid does not come in degrees. This is surprising.
But is this a counterintuitive implication that should make us doubt the AntiThreshold Condition? I don't think so. Yes, it is intuitive to say sentences like, 'Fred is more afraid than Sally,' but all we're really saying is that Fred and Sally are both afraid, and Fred has more fear than Sally. We do not have to say that being afraid comes in degrees, but only that having fear does. To be afraid is to have 10 units of fear or more. Justification comes in degrees, but there is also the threshold property of being justified, which is the property of having a certain amount of justification or more. The AntiThreshold Condition plausibly determines that these threshold properties do not come in degrees. We are only tempted to think that threshold properties are also degreed properties because the words we use to refer to the threshold properties are often similar to the words we use to refer to the degreed properties. But on closer consideration, the threshold properties do not actually come in degrees. The problem with this second suggestion is that it conflicts with the AntiThreshold Condition. Confidence clearly is a determinable that comes in degrees, with properties like having small confidence, having moderate confidence, and so on, as its set of degree-ordered determinates. If the threshold view is true, then the determinates of belief would be a proper subset of that set. But then it follows from the Anti-Threshold
The Determinables Argument that Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees
Condition that belief does not come in degrees.
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In conclusion, belief fails to meet the Determinables-Determinates Condition. On the first suggestion, the proposed set of determinates failed to count as determinates because they did not entail the determinable. On the second suggestion, belief did not satisfy the Anti-Threshold Condition. There appear to be no other plausible candidates for being the set of degree-ordered determinates for belief. The determinables argument concludes that beliefs do not come in degrees.
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Conclusion
In §1- §3, I presented and criticized three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees.
In §2- §4, I presented three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees, all of which I endorse. I conclude that the preponderance of evidence supports thinking that beliefs do not come in degrees.
27 25 Thanks to Dan Korman and a referee of this journal for objections to earlier versions of the determinables argument that led to both the formulation of the Anti-Threshold Condition and its application here. 26 Since the writing of this paper, I learned of van Woudenberg and Peels (forthcoming), which also explores the metaphysics of degrees and the question of whether beliefs come in degrees. I recommend this clearly written and interesting paper for further exploration of this topic. 27 Fellowship (2009 Fellowship ( -2010 , the Mizzou Advantage Postdoctoral Fellowship (2010 Fellowship ( -2011 , and the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion (2016 Religion ( -2017 for support while working on this paper.
